Abstract: This commentary's claim is that Dänzer's argument does not suciently take into account the complexities of the global production of goods, the current corporate responsibility practices and the problems of attributing responsibility to single actors. I argue in favour of a shared responsibility and briey present a discursive approach for attributing MNE's share of responsibility in global supply chains, which requires obligatory transparency.
Introduction
Many consumer goods are produced in factories of low-income countries, where working conditions are inhumane. Because national governments do not suciently regulate these problems, some argue that large brands 1 and retailers are responsible for ensuring decent working conditions in their supply chains. For example, while most companies oblige their suppliers to pay legal`minimum wages', non-governmental organizations (NGOs) criticize that often workers can not decently live on`minimum wages', 2 which forces them to work up to 18 hours a day, if they want to feed their families.
3 The Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC), for instance, argues that`living wages' 4 allow workers to live on 8 hours * I would like to thank Perscheng Assef for proof reading an earlier version of this text and Anton Leist and Sonja Dänzer for providing feedback on an earlier version of this text. All mistakes remain my own.
1 While Dänzer uses`multinational companies', I will use`brand' or`retailer' and later`lead rm'. 2 The government in Bangladesh recently xed 7 dierent pay grades for its legal minimum wages for dierent qualications. The lowest grade is xed at 3.000 Taka (ca. 30 Euro), while the highest pay is xed at 9.300 Taka (ca. 93 Euro).
3 Compare documents on: http://www.cleanclothes.org. 4 A living wage would guarantee that workers receive at least enough to meet basic needs for themselves and their families. To calculate the pure labour costs for sewing a T-Shirt, the CCC argues that it takes 11 Minutes of work for sewing and nishing a T-Shirt. Now, if workers are paid a living wage of 12.000 Taka, and if they work 20 days a month and 8 hours per day, labour costs for one minute of work are 1,25 Taka (a bit more than 1 Cent). So the labour costs of sewing a T-Shirt is maybe 0.13 Euros and the dierence to the minimum wages work a day with marginal production cost increases per piece (10-20 Cents). The CCC points out this situation and claims that brands/retailers are responsible for paying`living wages', which appeals to our intuition.
Dänzer explores a genuinely moral justication for the public intuition that brands and retailers are responsible for working conditions in their supply chains.
She rst uses ve criteria of Miller's (2007) `connection theory of remedial responsibility' to justify the moral intuition that a lead rm is remedially responsible for poor working conditions in its supply chains and concludes that lead rms generally share a remedial responsibility for working conditions in their supply chains. Second, she argues that also the suppliers share a remedial responsibility for working conditions and suggests that`structural characteristics' can help to assess how much remedial responsibility a lead rm shares, as compared to a supplier. Dänzer applies the Global Value Chain (GVC) framework to assess a lead rm's share of remedial responsibility and concludes that in`hierarchical' or captive' supply chain relationships a brand/retailer has a larger share of responsibility than his supplier; in contrast, in`market-based',`relational',`modular' relationships the supplier has a larger share.
This article discusses Dänzer's argument mainly with empirical knowledge about corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices in global garment value chains and with insights from recent GVC research. I try to point out that Dänzer insuciently recognizes the complexity of dening shared responsibility in global production networks. I also show that her argument does not provide enough guidance for identifying and particularly assigning companies' shared responsibility for working conditions in supply chainsand briey suggest an alternative approach.
I proceed as follows: section 2 gives an insight into companies' practices of managing their supply chains. Section 3 introduces current CSR practices and explains what companies do in order to`take responsibility' for working conditions in their supply chains. Section 4 outlines the problem of complexity for identifying lead rms' remedial responsibility. Section 5 examines Dänzer's criteria regarding remedial responsibilities in more detail, and in section 6, I present an alternative discursive approach to assigning corporate responsibility.
Finally, I provide some conclusions.
Global Garment Supply/Value Chains
Garment supply chains are long and complex, and many actors are involved in the production of a piece of garment (compare Starmanns 2010) . The production of a simple T-Shirt usually takes place in various legally independent companies.
While most garment brands' headquarters can be found in Europe or the USA, their production takes place in`developing' countries with low labour costs and poor labour law regulation. A simplied garment supply chain can be separated into four dierent value adding or production processes (see gure 1 ). The is around 10 Cents per T-Shirt. See also: Wie`fair' wird Outdoorbekleidung produziert?, NZZ (12.8.2011 ).
three production processes (B/C/D) are usually sub-divided into many single processes, which often take place in legally independent companies, most of which operate under poor working conditions. The lead rm (A) is the company, whose responsibility is in question. It designs, markets and nally sells the product, but outsources the production processes to legally independent companies for cost reasons. The lead rm has a sourcing contract, either with a buying agent (A1not in gure) or directly with a garment producer (B). Brands specify the quality of the ingredients used by B, but they do not have direct contracts with textile producers (C) or bre producers (D). In gure 1`embeddedness' indicates that various actors inuence the chain governance, and`value (addition)' roughly points out where value is added.
EMBEDDEDNESS
NGOs, governments, ethical campaigns, consumers, media, private standard initiatives, consultants, competitors, ... In addition (P5), while some GVC scholars claim that the lead rm also determines a product's buying price (Humphrey/Schmitz 2001) , technically the lead rm and his supplier agree on a price under consideration of P1P4. However, a large brand is usually in a better bargaining position than the supplier, because the brand can always choose to place the order on another company.
VALUE (ADDITION) EUROPE
Even if changing the supplier results in additional costs, most brands regularly select new suppliers, which has been interpreted as part of a lead rm's`power' in`buyer-driven' chains (Gere 1994) . However, in some supply chains the supplier rather holds the power, because he is much larger than the lead rm.
Dänzer's article focuses on the relationships between the lead rm and its direct suppliers', whom she does not specify (is it B or A1?). She further argues: much of what will be said could be used to assess questions of responsibility with regard to other actors in the supply chain as well (178). While it is good to reduce complexity of research and focus on the direct contractual suppliers, I
suggest that there are also relevant problems related to working conditions in the textile and bre production, 5 which Dänzer's argumentation does not answer. Dänzer (178f.) argues that`structural properties' are relevant with regard to lead rm's responsibility for working conditions at the direct supply factory. She uses Gere et al.'s (2005) ve dierent`modes of governance' of the GVC framework (hierarchy, 6 captive, relational, modular and market-related) to assess a lead rm's responsibility for working conditions versus a supplier's responsibility. The GVC framework aims at understanding how companies govern their value/supply chains and why they do it that particular way (Gere et al. 2005) . It suggests that the answers (high/low) regarding three variables of the buyer-supplier relationship (complexity of transaction, codiability of information, supplier capability) determine in what`mode of governance' a lead rm will select to govern his supplier (compare table 1 ). Transaction costs are seen as the most important factor for determining whether a variable turns`high' or low' and therefore these costs determine the`mode of governance'. In sum, the GVC framework suggests that a brand governs its direct suppliers in one of the ve modes, because the brands' managers regard the transaction costs for chain governance as lowest this way. (Gere et al. 2005 ).
Complexity
Some scholars have recently argued that the GVC framework is little helpful for analysing problems connected to global production, as the`chain' concept does not respect the complexity of the globalized production of goods (Dicken 2001; Coe et al. 2008; 2008a; Hughes et al. 2008) . Dicken et al. (2001) suggest that`net-5 Regarding the problem in the textile industry: see http://www.greenpeace.org/ international/en/campaigns/toxics/water/detox/intro/ and regarding the workers' problems in the cotton elds, see: http://www.ecchr. eu/usbekistan.html (3.8.2011). 6 While in the introduction Dänzer (177) points out that she focuses on lead rm's relationships to direct suppliers, who are legally independent, she here presents the hierarchical mode of governance, where suppliers, per denition, belong to the lead rm.
works' better conceptualize processes of global production than`chains'. Their global production network (GPN) framework involves relationships between producers, but also between the producers and the various actors, who all inuence the production (brands, producers, governments, industry lobby groups, NGOs, consumers etc.). It also includes issue related to`value addition', which might be helpful in the analysis of justice issues, but which the GVC framework ignores (compare gure 1 ). With regard to issues of responsibility the GPN might be reecting the complexity of the situation better than the GVC model.
Corporate Responsibility Practices in Global Value

Chains
In the last maybe 1015 years brands and retailers have started to engage in so-called corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities, by which they also try to improve working conditions in global supply chains. Today, almost every large company agrees that they have some responsibility for working conditions in their supply chains. But there is little agreement on what exactly lead agents are responsibility to do: Are they responsible for working conditions at the contracted suppliers or does their responsibility extend to subcontracted producers and to suppliers' suppliers? Are buying companies responsible for implementing national laws (e.g.`minimum wages') or must working conditions go beyond this?
How long may it take a lead rm to implement`decent' working conditions? I briey present the CSR strategies currently used by garment companies in order to show how dicult it is to assess what it means for companies to`take responsibility' in their supply chains (compare for more details: Starmanns 2010).
I do this, because Dänzer (182) does not specify enough what she means by being remedially responsible for bad working conditions in their supply chains.
Three main CSR practices are relevant here:
• First, most brands dene certain working standards in their Codes of Conduct (CoC), which are pretty standardized today. Most brands refer to the national laws and the core labour norms of the International Labour Organization (ILO). However, while some brands demand the legal`minimum wages' others demand`living wages'. This dierence is important because many claim that the former do not provide workers with enough money to be able to survive. Companies also dene which production processes in the supply chain must comply with the CoC (i.e. only producers at stage B or also subcontractors or also producers at stage C and D in gure 1 )?
This extent of corporate responsibility diers a lot between companies.
• Second, most lead rms then control (audit) whether the suppliers comply with their CoC and which standards are not fullled; but audits do not improve the situation of the workers and they are expensive.
• Third, some brands also support their suppliers in improving the working standards, but these practices dier very much and so does the time and eorts to implement standards. For instance, few companies try to adapt their purchasing policies to the extent that prices do not conict with the demands of implementing working standards.
Despite such eorts, many argue that there is hardly a factory in the`Global South' that has properly implemented the ILO Core Norms and`living wages' (Locke et al. 2006; 2007; Barrientos/Smith 2006) . It is often argued that the implementation of standards needs time, without specifying how long workers should wait for decent standards. An attempt trying to justify that lead rms are remedially responsible for working conditions has to deal with these problems.
Corporate Responsibility and Complexity
Trying to conceptualize rms' moral responsibility for working conditions in global garment production, Iris Young (2004; 2006) points out that responsibility cannot be attributed to single actors (governments, companies, consumers) and that no single actor can be blamed as the only one morally responsible (cf. 7 While consumers are generally shocked about`sweatshop' working conditions, most of them are primarily interested in the price, functionality and design of a product andat the tillcare little about poor working conditions far away (cf. Devinney et al. 2010) . Lead rms, accordingly, put most of their eorts into the marketing, design, functionality and maybe quality of their garments and try to keep the price competitive, while ethical criteria are treated with less relevancearguing that the legal system in the production countries must deal with such issues. To remain competitive, they outsource labour intensive production processes to countries with low labour costs, like Bangladesh or China. Producers in these countries are usually interested in getting many orders by lead rms and do not decline orders they actually could not manage under good conditions, while most workers need a job and will therefore continue to work, even if working conditions are miserable. The governments of producing countries often care more for rising export gures than for workers' rights. To attract orders, the government of Bangladesh, for instance, purposely sets the national minimum wages below existence-levels, fearing that otherwise buyers place orders in other countries. The government is strongly inuenced by the industry lobby, who keep on warning that orders move to competing countries and that consequently most factories in Bangladesh are shut down, if minimum wages were set too high.
In this situation, Young argues, it does not make sense to blame one single actor for being (remedially) responsible for poor outcomes in supply chains. She suggests that various actors share a forward-looking (prospective) responsibility and that four criteria determine their share of responsibility: power, privilege, interests and collective ability (Young 2006, 127.) . One of her central arguments is that`background conditions' need to be challenged. These are the accepted and expected rules and conventions that we follow, often in a habitual way, like the fashion system or the market competition. She emphasises that without addressing these`background conditions' we will not substantially improve the situation of workers in global supply chains.
I will turn now to Dänzer's arguments for remedial responsibility and discuss them by drawing on knowledge from sections 24. • CR1: A is morally responsible for the wrongs to B 9
• CR2: A is outcome responsible for the wrongs to B
• CR3: A is causally responsible for the wrongs to B 10
• CR4: A has benetted from processes that lead to B's deprivation
• CR5: A has the capacity to remedy wrongs Dänzer (182) regards lead agents as remedially responsible, if most of these criteria are fullled. She importantly points out that dierent actors might full these criteria at the same time, in which case they share remedial responsibility.
If dierent criteria point to dierent agents and conict, we have to rely on our intuitions about the relative importance of dierent sources of connection (Dänzer, 183, quoting Miller 2007, 107) . I suggest that due to the complexities of global production in most supply chains brands, suppliers, consumers and governments full CR1CR5, maybe to a dierent degree (see Young 2006 ). I will now present her main criteria (CR1 CR5) for morally justifying that lead agents share a remedial responsibility and show why these criteria are not sucient for determining remedial responsibility. 8 Miller and Dänzer present six criteria, but the`community' criterion does not apply in global value chains.
9 P in Dänzer's paper is B here. 10 She later discusses C3 together with C2.
Outcome Responsibility
Dänzer (184) introduces four criteria by Miller (2007) to identify whether a lead rm is outcome responsible for poor working conditions in its supply chains: (1) causal contribution, (2) control over one's actions, (3) a reasonable foreseeable connection between action and outcome, and (4) other options for action. She suggests that lead agents generally full all four criteria and therefore concludes that they all share outcome responsibility for wrongs in their supply chains.
She then uses the GVC framework to assess the strength of the lead agent's outcome responsibility, as compared to his supplier's share. She concludes:
• In hierarchical and captive relationships a lead rm is rather outcome responsible than its supplier.
• In relational, modular and market-based relationships a supplier is rather outcome responsible than the lead rm.
I now discuss in more detail the four criteria determining outcome responsibility.
Causal contribution
Her rst condition for outcome responsibility is that the agent must in some way have causally contributed to the outcome (184). She suggests that lead rms' purchasing policies always provide either incentives or disincentives for poor working conditionsand therefore lead rms causally contribute to wrongs.
However, because dierent factors contribute to poor working conditions, Dänzer (185) uses the GVC framework to assess whether the lead rm importantly 11 causally contributed to poor working conditions. She claims:
• In hierarchical and captive supply chain relationships purchasing policies are a relevant causal contribution to wrongs.
• In market, relational and modular chain relationships purchasing policies do not directly cause wrongs.
• In market relationships, in which a company buys huge amounts, purchasing policies can be seen as relevant causal contribution to wrongs.
I have three comments. First, using the GVC framework does not seem helpful.
On the one hand, Dänzer uses the framework to argue that hierarchical/captive relationships`importantly' contribute, while relational/modular/market relationships do not. On the other hand, she points out that lead agents in market relations`importantly' causally contribute, if large amounts are bought. For assessing whether lead agents' purchasing policies`importantly' causally contribute to a situation in the supply factory, a better criterion than the`mode of governance' might be the order size, relative to the factory capacity.
Second, whether a lead rm's purchasing policies`importantly' contributes to poor working conditions can only be assessed when considering the more complex 11 It should be noted that Dänzer seems to use the terms`importantly'/`relevantly'/`directly' synonymously, without explaining it. situation including other actors' contributions. Given the fact that many governments in Asia legally determine below-subsistence`minimum wages' in most industry sectors, a factory is legally obliged to pay these wages, and lead agents demand that their suppliers full the national laws. Who now`importantly' caused low wages?
Third, it might not be required to qualify a lead agent's connection to the wrongs for assessing his outcome responsibility. Let's consider an extreme case:
A small company K buys small amounts at a large supplier in a market-based relationship. The lead rm has no power over the supplier, but it is highly competitive because his supplier works with unpaid children. According to Dänzer's application of the GVC framework, K would not be outcome responsible, because it did not`importantly' causal contribute. However, the example suggests that the lead rm is outcome responsible, because it is causally connected to these wrongs.
Control over ones' actions & other options for action
Dänzer's (186f.) second and fourth conditions for ascribing outcome responsibility both concern the lead rm's agency. Dänzer tries to oppose the common argument that lead rms cannot be responsible, because they are just reacting • Lead rms are able to control their actions; they are not coerced by the inherent necessities of the market.
• Lead rms do have a certain option range open to them.
• Lead rms have other options and can act in a way to avoid bad outcome. I also do not support her claim that every lead rm has another option and could have acted in a way to avoid bad outcome (and remain competitive).
The reasons behind this are competition between lead rms, regulation gaps and lacking consumer interest in working standards. Every company will have limitations regarding what it can invest into improving working conditions, depending on factors like its business strategy, its customers and its competitors' actions. For instance, Hess Natur sells eco-fashion to customers, who are willing to pay more for`ethical' fashionand therefore can implement high ecological and social standards in its whole supply chain. In contrast, Aldi's business strategy is to sell cheap products to customers, who go to Lidl, if Aldi's prices went up too much. Aldi will have more diculties to invest much money into higher social standards in its supply chains. In this example, the companies' business model would not allow it to avoid bad outcomes in its supply chain; consequently, Aldi would have no other options and one criterion for outcome responsibility is not fullled. I therefore suggest that`other options' is no good criterion for assigning remedial responsibility.
Lead rm can reasonably foresee connection between the action and outcome Dänzer's (186) third condition demands that lead rms could reasonably foresee, or know about, the negative eect some of their causal contributions have for the conditions in their supply chains. She suggests:
• In hierarchical, captive and (to a smaller degree) relational supply chain relationships lead rms know about the poor working conditions in their supply chains: due to the high levels of monitoring, coordination and closeness they can be expected to make the connection to their purchasing policy and requirements (187).
• In market-based relationships lead rms know that buying large quantities of (certain) commodities relevantly contributes to the protability of criminal businesses and thereby supports the continuation of the wrongs (187).
Surely a lead rm shall somehow foresee that his actions cause harm to be outcome responsiblebut it does not make sense to dierentiate between modes of governance, since lead rmsregardless of their mode of governancecan demand audit reports from their supplier and thus know about the working conditions. However, it might rather be more dicult for a company placing a small order in a large company to be demanding audit reports, if it is the only company doing so. But it could also select a smaller supplier.
Moral Responsibility
Dänzer (188) argues that for an agent to be morally responsible for something he must have acted in a way that displays moral fault: he must have deprived P deliberately or recklessly, or he must have failed to provide for P despite having a pre-existing obligation to do so.
12 She suggests that lead agents full this criterion, if they know about wrongs in their supply chains and still go on contributing to them. Regarding the GVC framework, her claims are:
12 In this quote`P' stands for the garment factory that we called`B'.
• In hierarchical and captive relationships lead agents know about wrongs.
• In modular relationships lead agents are not likely to know about wrongs.
• In markets lead agents know about moral wrongs, if the production of some commodities is well known to imply weighty moral wrongs.
The claim intuitively makes sense. But what does it mean that a lead rm still goes on contributing to poor working conditions? As I explained in section 3, most large lead rms have CSR programmes and slowly improve working conditions. Do these companies still contribute to the wrongs? We might argue that a company demanding`minimum wages' is morally responsible for the wrongs, because it does not do anything to stop the low wages.
I do not support her conclusions regarding the GVC, but rather argue that all lead agents can know about moral wrongs. Empirical evidence shows that in the production of very many labour-intensive goods we can expect poor working conditions (Starmanns 2010 ). It has also been shown that even if buying or quality sta visits factories, they do not identify more subtle problems related to wages, worker discrimination, freedom of association etc. (Starmanns 2010) .
To identify the concrete problems in a particular factory, a lead agent must have a proper system of monitoring working conditions in place, and this can be done in any mode of governance. However, a very small lead rm might have diculties to nance such a system, but it could try to cooperate with others.
Finally, Dänzer blames actors to behave morally wrong, which might not make sense (see section 4 ). Can we blame lead agents, if they agree with their suppliers on the purchasing criteria P1P5, but if the suppliers then do not full the standards? Before a supplier signs a contract, a factory manager should actually know, whether he can produce the required goods and at the same time respect the required conditions. He could decide not to sign a contract, if the agreed price is not enough to suciently pay wages to the workers and to guarantee good working conditions. However, the buyer will very likely nd another factory that oers a lower price, promising to full the same conditions, maybe because it is working more eciently. A factory that is not working very eciently, will not earn much money and is thus required to pay low wages. But ineciently working factories do exist, they want to get orders and give jobs to the people, therefore many accept oers they should actually decline. But most governments do not care whether working conditions are poor.
Therefore, due to the problems of`structural injustice', blaming brands and retailers might make them move a bit, because they fear reputation losses; but it also moves the problem on to the suppliers. We should nd a solution that allows all companies to respect working rights, like a common obligatory standard for all. And companies have no moral right to lobby against this.
Benetting from Wrongs
Dänzer (189) argues that another criterion for remedial responsibility is whether the lead rm benets from moral`wrongs'. In her view, this is fullled, because lead agents structurally benet from the processes that lead to bad working conditions.
• A case for moral`wrong' is when more (i.e. subsistence wages) could be paid without the supplier and MNE going bankrupt.
Benetting from wrongs' seems to be a plausible criterion for remedial responsibility. However, Dänzer needs to specify: First, what is`wrong' ? Regarding living wages' many companies say that there is no common denition regarding how high a`living wage' should be.
Second, whom does she mean, when she says that the`lead rm' benets.
Who is benetting: The CEO, managers, employees, shareholders or someone else? And how do the benets inuence the lead rms' share of remedial responsibility? For instance, lead rm A generates 1.000 jobs and no prots, while rm B generates 50.000 jobs and 500 Million Euros prots. Is company B more remedially responsible than company A?
Third, it intuitively does not seem right to trade o a lead agents' bankruptcy for living wagesi.e. a lead rm would only be obliged to pay decent wages, if this does not lead it into bankruptcy. The payment of decent wages is rather a human right, and if a lead rm cannot make sure that suppliers pay these, it should not operate.
But what happens to a company that lost most of its customers to its competitor, because its business model only functions by exploiting workers? Suppose, Aldi demands from its suppliers to pay living wages. This would aect the product prices, and in consequence the customers would shop at Lidl. Lidl would make more prots and continue to produce under poor conditions, because it does not see any reason to demand living wages. From a moral perspective, this outcome would be even worse. But morally, we also cannot agree with the situation that allow Aldi and Lidl to continue paying poor wages. The only solution for this collective action problem might be an institution that obliges all rms to pay decent wages.
Capacity to Remedy
Dänzer argues that the lead rm responsible for remedy should also have the capacity to remedy wrongs. She proposes that the actor most capable of improving poor working conditions (in terms of eectiveness and minimal costs), should do so. If various actors are capable of improving working conditions, the responsibility should be shared. She adds:
• In hierarchical, captive and relational chains lead rms have the capacity to improve working conditions in their supply chains.
• In modular and market-based chains lead rms have less capacity to improve the situation, but could nd other paths of improving the situation.
It surely makes sense to nd most eective and cost ecient ways of improving labour standards. But I have three objections: First, I do not think that it is possible, in practice, to evaluate dierent actors'`capacity' to remedy wrongs without more transparency about their ways of doing business. Companies would therefore need to be more transparent.
Second, if a lead rm places many small orders at very many suppliers, his suppliers will be able to improve working conditions more eectively and at lower costs. The lead agent would not full the`capacity' criterion for remedial responsibility, due to his high costs. The`capacity' to remedy might be better operationalized by the size of lead agents' order, as compare to the factory capacity and maybe the length of relationship to the supplier. A company only lling 1% of a factories' capacity will have diculties to improve the workers' situation, whereas a company that lls 90% of a factory will have a large inuence on the supplier. However, every lead rm can change his purchasing practices, so why do we try to dierentiate between dierent lead rms? Third, it is most likely that governments have the highest capacity to remedy the situation. Does that mean that lead agents and suppliers are not remedially responsible?
Conclusions Regarding Remedial Responsibility
Each of the four criteria of remedial responsibility discussed above seems to indicate that a lead agent carries some remedial responsibility for wrongs in their supply chains. But I argued that in the complex situation of`structural injustice' solutions for such problems need to identify the role of dierent actors instead of just blaming the lead rms for being responsible for poor working conditions. I will sum up my arguments with regard to the four criteria by focussing on the question, whether a lead rm like Adidas is remedially responsible for implementing`living wages':
• Outcome responsibility: With its purchasing policies Adidas causally contributes to poor wages`in some way'; we would have to look at their purchasing practices in detail to know whether Adidas contributed`importantly'. Adidas has a certain control over its actions and it has other options, as the research on the football industry shows (Nadvi et al. 2011 ).
Most lead rms have some space to manoeuvre. Whether they can pay a living wages with this and remain competitive depends on factors like: the business strategy, the shareholders' demands for prots, the competitors' actions, prices, customers' demand for`ethical' products etc. In addition, the market system does not prevent or sanction rms from externalizing social and environmental costs, but rather motivates them to do so. Finally, Adidas can surely foresee the bad outcome regardless of the mode of governance, due to the fact that the company alone employs more than 80 social auditors.
• Moral responsibility: Adidas knows about low wages in the supply chain, independent of its relationship to the suppliers. It takes eorts in improving working conditions in its supply chain, but it does not oblige its suppliers to pay`living wages'. The fact that other companies are de-manding their suppliers to pay`living wages' could be reason enough to say that Adidas fulls the moral responsibility criterion (if others can, Adidas could also).
• Benetting from wrongs: Adidas' shareholders and employers are surely benetting from the fact that workers are producing their products. Intuitively it seems morally wrong to generate 500 Million Euros prot, while there are social and working problems in the supply chain. Making prots in that height is surely a criterion for remedial responsibility. However, I would also argue that also not-for-prot companies have a remedial responsibility, but this might not be connected to the`benetting' argument.
• Capacity to remedy: Without detailed information about the order and the buyers' and suppliers' situation, it is dicult to evaluate whether Adidas or its supplier is more`capable' of raising the workers' pay. However, it intuitively seems wrong to make the capacity to remedy criterion dependent on current (contingent) supply chain relationships, because this does not reect the complexity of the problem.
In summary, I would rather argue that we do not need all criteria presented by Dänzer (CR1CR5) to make lead agents remedially responsible for working conditions in their supply chains. Rather, a lead rm is remedially responsible:
because they participate by their actions in the ongoing schemes of cooperation that constitute these structuresin the sense that they are part of the process that causes them (Young 2006, 114) .
This corresponds with the two criteria:
• if it is somehow connected to the wrongs in the supply chain,
• if it knows that certain fundamental workers rights and human rights are not fullled in the supply chain and still sources from this factory.
However, as various actors share remedial responsibility, a moral argument would need to determine the lead agents' share of remedial responsibility. I suggested that the GVC framework does not help to identify which lead rms are more responsible than their suppliers. I argued that if we used this framework, rms that intuitively are responsible might end up being less responsible than their supplierapplying the GVC model to Dänzer's question leads to the problem that we base a moral decision on a contingent situation.
I claim that due to the complexity of the situation, we are not able to determine the responsibility a priori. We should rather dene that companies are responsible to comply with certain internationally agreed working rights and human rights and answer the question of remedial responsibility case by case.
To identify the share of remedial responsibility, I propose that all actors causing structural injustices must engage in public discourses that nd a solution to the problems. (Habermas 1990, 195) , which will produce in all people the perception of a solution that was created jointly during the discourse (Scherer/Palazzo 2007 , 1105 . Deliberation presupposes the willingness to expose one's position to validity claims and the motivation to strive for mutual understanding. In contrast to bargaining, participants are ready to change their opinions during discourse. As a precondition, a deliberative politics approach goes beyond narrow self-interested manipulations and includes a concern for the well-being of the whole, and that sense of community is reinforced by the process of deliberation itself. The challenge of communicative access to legitimacy is to engage in true dialogue, to convince others of the validity of one's arguments but not to persuade or manipulate people (Palazzo/Scherer 2006, 81f.) .
Scherer/Palazzo assume that by engaging in discourses that aim at setting or redening standards and expectations in a globalized and changing world, corporations assume an enlarged political co-responsibility (Scherer/Palazzo 2007 , 1109 . Corporations must therefore proactively engage in the public process of exchanging arguments with stakeholders, while being transparent and accountable.
Although these demands are surely idealistic, the Fair Wear Foundation (FWF) can be seen as a quite deliberative responsibility approach (for a more detailed analysis : Starmanns 2010) . Companies can become member in the FWF, where dierent stakeholders come together to dene the rules of operation together with NGOs and trade unions. The FWF also demands from their members to be transparent about their approach to remedial responsibility, so the FWF and other actors can verify their approach and complain, if the measures set are, for instance, moving too slow. Part of the voluntary initiative is that sta members check whether the lead rms' purchasing conditions conict with each other or not. Lead rms and suppliers also sit together and realistically try to calculate prices that allow the payment of living wages (Miller/Williams 2009 ). Although the FWF lacks the transparency that would be needed in a political responsibility approach, they represent a good step into that direction.
Conclusions
In this article I used theoretical and empirical insights from research on global value chains and global production networks to discuss Dänzer's moral justication regarding lead rms' responsibility for working conditions in their supply chains. I argued that Dänzer's criteria for assessing remedial responsibility do not capture the complexity of attributing responsibility in global production networks. I particularly claimed that the GVC framework is inappropriate for identifying remedial responsibility, due to these complexities.
I suggested that two of Dänzer's criteria should be sucient for arguing that a lead rm is remedially responsible for working conditions: First, the lead rm must somehow be connected to the wrongs in the supply chain (international human and labour rights would dene`wrongs'). Second, the lead rm must know that certain fundamental worker and human rights are not fullled in its supply chain and still source from this factory. As worker rights violations are common in supply chains in low-income countries, lead agents have the prospective responsibility to nd out about wrongs. In contrast to Dänzer's argument, such an argumentation allows making lead rms responsible for processes in other parts of the chain (e.g. the textile or cotton production: see gure 1 ).
Regarding remedial responsibility, I argued with Young (2004; 2006) Due to the complexities of ascribing responsibility for improving working standards in supply chains, I suggested a discursive approach to attributing remedial responsibility. Based on the fact that lead agents are responsible for their supply chains, because they are connected to them, rms would have to come together with other actors, who are also contributing and who share a responsibility, like suppliers, governments, consumers. Together, they would dene the path companies shall take to remedy their responsibility and what share the other actors are willing to take. One possible criterion is the share of orders a single actor has in a factory. Only in working together, rms will manage to make major changes for the workers.
However, since most companies do not voluntarily come together to make sure that decent standards are dened and implemented in their chains, I suggested that governments have the responsibility to create the background conditions that allows a public discourse from taking place and from decent standards being implemented. Governments must oblige all lead rms to comply with the same standards in order to create a`level-playing-eld', and to be transparent about their operations. And companies have the responsibility not to prevent these rules from being set up, for instance, through lobbying.
Despite 15 years of CSR activities, many workers in the garment industry still work up to 18 hours a day to earn maybe 25$ a day, which then allows them to feed their families. I argued that this situation does not change, if we appeal to the morals of corporations alone. Instead, governments, companies and consumers need to share a remedial responsibility for improving the lives of workers.
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